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ORDERED LIBERTY: THE ORIGINAL INTENT
OF THE CONSTITUTION
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR.*
The Great Seal of the United States carries the inscription
"Novus Ordo Seclorum," celebrating the establishment of the new
order. These words trace their origin to the poet Virgil' and the
establishment of another republic-Rome. But the phrase, in-
scribed in the United States Senate Chamber and printed on every
dollar bill, also applies to the founding of our Republic. This year
we mark the bicentennial of the drafting of the document which es-
tablished that new order-the United States Constitution.
Two hundred years ago, the fifty-five delegates to the Constitu-
tional Convention had been in Philadelphia for nearly two months
debating the composition of our government. By the end of the
long, hot summer of 1787, the delegates had succeeded in minimiz-
ing the parochial interests and political differences that divided
them. The final document, the product of many compromises,
would unite a people as one nation.
But that was two centuries ago. Then we were an agrarian na-
tion of four million people, scattered along the edge of a seemingly
limitless frontier. Today we are an urban industrial society of nearly
a quarter of a billion people, connected by bonds of commerce and
geopolitics to every other nation of the globe. The application of
* Partner, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C. Former United States
Senator for Maryland. B.A., Haverford, 1944; LL.B., University of Maryland, 1949.
1. The phrase "Novus Ordo Seclorum" derives from Virgil's Eclogue IV, in which
the poet celebrates the return of the Golden Age:
Ultima Cumaei venit iam carminis aetas;
magnus ab integro saeclorum nascitur ordo.
iam redit et Virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna;
iam nova progenies caelo demittitur alto.
VIRGIL, ECLOGUE IV, I1. 4-7, at p. 10 (Oxford Univ. Press 1969). Translated, these lines
proclaim:
Now comes the last age of Cumaean song;
the great series of ages is born anew.
Now Justice returns, the Golden Age returns;
now a new lineage is sent down from the lofty sky.
The other Latin inscriptions appearing on the Great Seal, "Annuit Coeptis" and "E
Pluribus Unum," also trace their origins to Virgil. See J. BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTA-
TIONS 103 nn.10 & 15, 106 n.5 (15th ed. 1980).
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our two-hundred-year-old charter to the transformed conditions of
our national existence is far from self-evident.
For all we can say about the Constitution's preservation of our
freedom, its provisions are both luminous and obscure. Its message
to our day is punctuated by ambiguous silences, which have been
filled by the deafening clash of conflicting interpretations. Some of
its terrain is a map without a legend; nowhere within its four corners
does the document tell us how to interpret the disputes over its
meaning.
Some would attempt to transcend ambiguity by fixing the
meaning of the Constitution to its "original intent." According to
this view, the courts and other branches of government should be
bound by what we can divine of the intentions of those who wrote or
ratified the document. Adherents to this position obtain solace
from the supposed certainty of the "static meaning" provided in the
face of changing circumstances.
2
But as Justices Brennan, Stevens, and Marshall have recently
pointed out,' this position is not without its problems. Meeting in
secrecy, the drafters of the Constitution left incomplete records of
their proceedings. Indeed, the most comprehensive account, taken
by Madison, was not available to the public until some time after his
death.4 The first forty years of constitutional interpretation, includ-
2. Although by no means a new development, this view has received much attention
recently. The characterization of "original intent" is my own. For a fuller explanation
by the adherents of this position, see Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent and Econonic
Rights 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 23 (1986) (address before the University of San Diego Law
School); Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese III before the D.C. Chapter of the
Federalist Society, Lawyers Division, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 15, 1985) (available at
the Maryland Law Review); Speech by Justice Antonin Scalia Before the Attorney Gen-
eral's Conference on Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986) (available
at the Maryland Law Review).
3. See T. Marshall, Remarks at the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and
Trademark Law Association in Maui, Hawaii (May 6, 1987) (available at the MarVand
Law Review); J.P. Stevens, Address before the Federal Bar Association Luncheon Meet-
ing in Chicago, Illinois 7-11 (Oct. 23, 1985); W. Brennan, The Constitution of the
United States: Contemporary Ratification 4-5 (Oct. 12, 1985) (lecture delivered at Text
and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University) (available at the Maryland Law Re-
view). See generally R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 359-69 (1986).
4. J. MADISON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (G. Hunt ed. 1908).
Madison's will, drafted fourteen months before his death, contains the following
passage:
Considering the peculiarity and magnitude of the occasion which produced the
Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, the Characters who composed it, the Con-
stitution which resulted from their deliberations, its effects during a trial of so
many years on the prosperity of the people living under it, and the interest it
has inspired among the friends of free Government, it is not an unreasonable
inference that a careful and extended report of the proceedings and discussions
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ing the landmark decisions of John Marshall's Supreme Court, de-
veloped without this reference point so central to today's advocates
of "original intent." 5 In addition, the original intent theory begs
the question of whose intent, to the extent it is known, should com-
mand authority. To whom are we to look for guidance-the fifty-
five delegates who had a hand in drafting the Constitution, the par-
ticipants in the state ratifying conventions, or the popular sentiment
as reflected by newspaper articles or letters of the time?
Even if we arbitrarily confine our examination to the intent of
the delegates at the Convention, the question of whose intent we
should heed remains. The founders spoke not with one voice, but
with many. Jefferson once described the delegates as an "assem-
blage of demigods," 6 but their quarrels sometimes reached Olym-
pian proportions. Inevitably we tend to cite those with whom we
agree. Are we to look at the statements of Madison, Hamilton, Pat-
terson, Randolph, or Mason? All of these delegates made signifi-
cant contributions in shaping the Constitution, but each cherished
some lasting disagreements on certain provisions-Mason and Ran-
dolph did not even sign the final document.7
Perhaps the most vexing question about "original intent" is
why we should be bound by an interpretation of the Constitution
that, if it can be said to have existed as a coherent whole two hun-
dred years ago, is only imperfectly understood today. In a society
whose governmental power derives from the consent of the gov-
erned, our consent rests on our understanding of the organic docu-
ment. As Justice Brennan recently remarked, "[o]ur distance of two
centuries cannot but work as a prism refracting all we perceive. '"8
Arbitrarily fixing the meaning at the intent of the founders robs
modern America of the power to consent. It dismisses two centuries
of our national dialogue with the Constitution. It ignores the signif-
of that body, which were with closed doors, by a member who was constant in
his attendance, will be particularly gratifying to the people of the United States,
and to all who take an interest in the progress of political science and the
course of true liberty.
5. See P. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY AND NARRATIVE HISTORY 315-
33 (1978); C. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1962).
6. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in S.
PADOVER, THE LIVING U.S. CONSTITUTION 23-25 (J. Landzoski 2d ed. 1983).
7. Madison's notes are the best record of the Convention and the debates that oc-
curred among the delegates. See THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (W. Hutchinson & W.
Paschal ed. 1962). For good discussions of the debates and the delegates who declined
to sign the Constitution, see F. BARBASH, THE FOUNDING 185-96 (1987); C. COLLIER &J.
COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA (1986); P. SMITH, supra note 5, at 93-235.
8. W. Brennan, supra note 3, at 4.
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icant growth in our understanding over the last two centuries of the
"new order" the framers established.9 As Justice Marshall recently
stated, "When the Founders used [the phrase "We the People"] in
1787, they did not have in mind the majority of America's citi-
zens." 0 A civil war, twenty-six amendments, and tremendous so-
cial, political, and technological changes have put flesh on the bones
of the Constitution, thus altering our reading and relationship to it.
Why should we ignore this history when we read the Constitution?
Why should we who have been molded by that history not partici-
pate in the debate?
In the final analysis, it is far from clear that the founders wanted
their interpretation chiseled into the document. Was it the "original
intent" that "original intent" should govern? The evidence for that
proposition is sparse, and the founders' own common-law tradition
held no distaste for the notion of evolving legal standards."
But if the answer provided by advocates of "original intent" is
inadequate, the question to which it responds is serious. How ought
we to interpret the Constitution? If "original intent" is not our only
guide, do we surrender the Constitution's meaning to any reading?
Is its meaning whatever the judges say it is? Is meaning to be mea-
sured, in the epithet addressed to the old courts of equity, by the
length of the chancellor's foot? Or do we adopt the constitutional
jurisprudence of the Tammany politician who in response to Presi-
dent Grover Cleveland's rejection on constitutional grounds of a
proposed bill, said, "What's the Constitution among friends?"' 2
We cannot reject the theory of "original intent" without adopt-
ing some other guiding principle for constitutional interpretation.
The search for that principle is not merely a quibble among legal
scholars; it has a significance for every citizen. Federal power is
9. Although no more clairvoyant than we are today, the insight of the framers is at
times astounding. The Convention was divided along sectional lines over the issue of
slavery. George Mason, a southerner and one of the largest slaveholders and landown-
ers in the colonies, however, took on the South. In a statement that foreshadowed the
conflagration that would engulf the Nation some eighty years later, Mason declared,
"Every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant. They bring the judgment of heaven on a
country. As nations cannot be rewarded or punished in the next world, they must be in
this. By an inevitable chain of causes and effects Providence punishes national sins by
national calamities." See F. BARBASH, supra note 7, at 156.
10. T. Marshall, supra note 3, at 2.
II. For a very good book on the intellectual origins of the Constitution, see F. Mc-
DONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1985). See also L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 33-104 (2d ed. 1985) (dis-
cussing early American legal tradition).
12. L. FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS at v (1978).
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predicated on constitutional authority. Our interpretation of that
authority determines when government may act and when it must
stay its hand. The results of that interpretation will have conse-
quences for all of us: for warriors and for worshipers, in the Na-
tion's boardrooms and in its bedrooms.
In searching for these principles of interpretation, we must look
behind the words of the Constitution. The answer may be embed-
ded in the underlying principles and doctrines of the document.
For the founders and for us, the Constitution is not only a blueprint
for government. It was and is a system of ordered liberty.' 3 As
Thomas Paine wrote in The Rights of Man, "The American Constitu-
tions were to Liberty what a grammar is to language: they define its
parts of speech, and practically construct them into syntax.'
'14
It is hard to believe that those who crafted the Constitution
wanted to freeze the debate in the circumstances of their own time.
The authors of the Constitution saw both the value and necessity of
robust debate. This view was grounded in a respect for individual
differences and the reality that there was no way to squelch those
differences without destroying the precious liberty the founders
sought to preserve. Thus, the founders looked to a framework
within which debate would continue; they sought the ordered liberty
of a republic. The founders were well aware that differences of
opinion might have consequences that could manifest themselves in
either the reasoned or the arbitrary use of power.' 5
Not surprisingly, the central issue confronting the Convention
was how much authority the new government should have and how
that authority should be controlled. As Madison stated in The Feder-
13. The term "ordered liberty" is not my own invention. I do not know its precise
origins. It does appear, however, as a description of our constitutional government in
some Supreme Court decisions. In applying the fifth amendment prohibition against
double jeopardy to the states, Justice Cardozo in his opinion for the majority in Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937), wrote that rights "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" must be "absorbed" by the fourteenth amendment. Justice Clark in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), used the term in a similar way in applying the
fourth amendment's exclusionary rule--the rule which ensures that unreasonable
searches do not take place by suppressing evidence that is illegally obtained-to the
states. See also G. FEINER, ORDERED LIBERTY (1983).
14. T. PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN pt. 1, reprinted in THE SELECTED WORK OF TOM
PAINE 143 (H. Fast ed. 1945).
15. It would not be an understatement to say that the founders were acutely aware of
the ramifications of differing opinions. They recognized that the free expression of
thoseopinions was both necessary and potentially damaging to any republic, for if left
undisturbed, republics could splinter into factions. Madison initially discusses the prob-
lem of conflicting rival parties in The Federalist No. 10; his description of the Constitu-
tion's solution to this problem waits until The Federalist No. 51.
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alist No. 51, "In framing a government which is to be administered
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first en-
able the government to controul the governed; and in the next
place, oblige it to controul itself."'1 6 The founders were faced with a
dilemma. They had to navigate the troubled waters between Scylla
and Charybdis, avoiding the anarchy that could develop from too
weak a central government and the tyranny that could spring from a
monarchy. To chart this difficult course the men who wrote the
Constitution consulted a priceless chart-the lessons of history.
The genius of the authors of the Constitution was not inven-
tion, but the application of historical lessons to a rational, coordi-
nated, and successful system. In fact, it was their grasp of history
and their knowledge of political thought that enabled the founders
to transcend the moment and craft a document that was, as the pre-
amble states, "for ourselves and our posterity."'"
We know that the founders drew on the experience of the
Greek city-states, the Roman Republic, and other ancient civiliza-
tions.18 But the key to the problem of limiting arbitrary state power
was closer at hand: the struggle carried on in England since the
days of the Magna Carta.
In 1215 King John, cornered at Runnymede, was forced by the
feudal barons to sign the Great Charter. The barons were deter-
mined to check the power of the Crown, particularly the King's
power to demand money or services, or to confiscate property arbi-
trarily. The Great Charter proclaimed that "no freeman shall be
seized, or imprisoned, or possessed, or outlawed, or in any way de-
stroyed ... except... by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the
laws of the land.' 9 Here we see in embryonic form the "due pro-
cess of law" embodied in our fifth and fourteenth amendments.
But the framers also found a limitation on the power of the sov-
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
17. U.S. CONST. preamble.
18. Madison's notes on the debates at the Convention as well as the personal papers
of many delegates at the Convention substantiate this point. Madison, for example,
made an extensive study of the "record" of other republics just before the Convention.
In addition, The Federalist Papers, written by Hamilton, Madison, andJay, often cite exam-
ples from ancient republics or English history to make their points. For example,
Madison cites the Republic of Venice as an example of the tyranny that can result if all
power is concentrated in the hands of one individual or one branch of government. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 335-36 U. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Even the pseudo-
nym chosen by the authors of The Federalist Papers is of classical origin-"Publius, " whom
Plutarch portrays as the great defender of the Roman Republic.




ereign in the Magna Carta, which placed the law higher than the
King. Further, the founders must have understood that history
transformed the Great Charter into something far more than its
drafters could possibly have originally intended. Envisioned as a
narrow protection of feudal privilege, it became a statement of prin-
ciple, a reference point for those imperiled by the arbitrary actions
of government.
Other elaborations of the principle followed. In 1629 Parlia-
ment issued its Petition of Right 20 in response to the attempt by
Charles I to bypass Parliament's taxing authority. The final result
was a civil war and the beheading of a King: a graphic reminder to
future sovereigns that the legislature could not be ignored. In 1679
the Habeas Corpus Act 2' further restrained the sovereign, and the
English Bill of Rights22 issued by William and Mary in 1689 estab-
lished the claims of petition. 23 Although all of these limitations
were the product of specific political crises, their meaning evolved in
response to changing conditions.24
This history, which was closely studied by many of the foun-
ders, demonstrated the need to check authority and to assure the
supremacy of law over arbitrary will. But if British history cautioned
against unlimited powers held by the King or even a national gov-
ernment, life under the Articles of Confederation showed the dan-
gers of the opposite extreme.
Before 1776 there was no central colonial government. Each
colony had its own government that was answerable to the Crown.
Within the framework of some general laws established by the
20. 3 Car., ch. 1, § 10 (1628). On June 7, 1628, Charles I assented to the Petition of
Right, thereby making it a statute. The statute provided that "no man hereafter be com-
pelled to make or yield any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or such like charge, without
comment consent by act of parliament." 1J. DE LOLME, THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE
ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 377 (1978).
21. 31 Car. 2, ch. 2 (1679). Even though the common law and the Petition of Right
prohibited arbitrary imprisonment, systemic corruption permitted the power of granting
the writ of habeas corpus to lie solely within the discretion of judges. The Habeas
Corpus Act stripped this absolute discretion away from judges by requiring judges to
receive bail in all bailable offenses. SeeJ. DE LOLME, supra note 20, at 454-55.
22. 1 W. & M., ch. 2 (1689).
23. This clause of the Bill of Rights gave subjects of the kingdom the right to petition
the King to remedy grievances. This law also prohibited the King and his bench from
prejudging a petition or prosecuting the petitioners for raising a grievance.
24. See generally W. EVERDELL, THE END OF KINGS: A HISTORY OF REPUBLICS AND
REPUBLICANS (1983); W. CHURCHILL, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES (H.
Commanger ed. 1965); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON TIlE LAWS OF ENGLAND (W.
Lewis ed. 1898); E. COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR PARTS
(15th ed. 1794).
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mother country, each colony acted with autonomy from others. The
signing of the Declaration of Independence augmented this auton-
omy by making the colonies separate and independent states. But to
fight a common war against a great power, more than an assertion of
independence was needed. The Articles of Confederation provided
a loose arrangement for cooperation among the sovereign states.25
Under the Articles there was a legislature, a unicameral Con-
gress in which each state, regardless of its population, wielded only
one vote. The sole Executive merely presided over meetings, with-
out exercising any other independent authority.2 6
In fact, what little power the Articles delegated to the national
legislature was virtually unenforceable. Congressional requisitions
on the states for taxes or military supplies could be and, at times,
were ignored. In addition, several important areas were completely
beyond the authority of the national legislature. The Articles of
Confederation provided for no legislative control over foreign or
interstate commerce, 27 and although the legislature could make
treaties, it had no means of enforcing them. 8
When peace finally arrived after eight years of revolutionary
war, the situation deteriorated. Without the unifying threat of the
British invasion, rallying even minimal cooperation was difficult.
Foreign powers encroached on American soil, while Barbary pirates
preyed on American shipping overseas.2 9
Added to these foreign problems were the domestic disputes
over interstate commerce among the independent states. My own
state of Maryland almost came to blows with Virginia over fishing
rights on the Potomac River and shipping rights on the Chesapeake
Bay. A hapless government floundered in the face of many serious
challenges. The promising beginning, symbolized by the bold
words of freedom in the Declaration of Independence, seemed con-
demned to failure by the weaknesses of the Articles of
Confederation.
While history provided lessons on the dangers of too much or
too little governmental authority, political philosophy held the key
25. See C. COLLIER &J. COLLIER, supra note 7, at 1-14; P. SMITH, supra note 5. at 71-
92.
26. See Articles of Confederation, art. 5, cl. 4 (U.S. 1777), reprnted in A. JENSON, THE
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-
TORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 264 (1940). The Executive's lack of independent
power is evident from the silence of the Articles of Confederation on this matter.
27. See id. at art. 9, cl. 4.
28. See id. at art. 9, cl. 1.
29. C. COLLIER &J. COLLIER, supra note 7, at 5-6.
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to finding a middle ground. Fortunately, those who drafted the
Constitution were familiar with and able to draw from a rich tradi-
tion in political thought, from the classical writings of Plato, Aris-
totle, Plutarch, and Cicero, to more modern sources such as
Blackstone, Montesquieu, and Locke.3 ° In 1787 classical republi-
canism, the idea of elected government based on popular support,
was in the mainstream of American thought.
Aristotle had categorized government into three ideal forms-
monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. The defining aspect of all
three was derived from the number of rulers in each-one, few, or
all of the people. Unfortunately, as Aristotle noted, each moved to-
ward a perverted form that abused power. Monarchy was reduced
to tyranny; aristocracy became oligarchy; and democracy eroded
into anarchy. The fundamental flaw in each of these degraded
forms of government was the concentration of all power into the
hands of the ruler. 31
To correct this deficiency, a new model was needed. The fram-
ers found it in the doctrine of the separation of powers. As Madison
said, "The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is
the celebrated Montesquieu."32 Appropriately, the 300th anniver-
sary of Montesquieu's birthday will coincide with the bicentennial of
our national government under the Constitution.
Montesquieu attempted to find the rational basis for law by ex-
amining actual legal systems. According to Montesquieu, only the
separation of authority into three distinct branches-judicial, execu-
tive, and legislative-could avoid the tendency of government to-
ward abusing power. While there are differences between his plan
and the one the founders adopted, there are many similarities. In
Montesquieu's plan, for example, the legislative branch, divided
into two chambers, had among its powers the impeachment of the
Executive and the power of the purse.33
It was with these theoretical and historical lessons in mind that
the founders approached the Convention in May of 1787. To be
sure, they were not all of one mind-economic, political, and sec-
30. An examination of Madison's notes on the debates at the Convention and the
personal papers of the delegates reveals their familiarity with history. It also reveals the
delegates' knowledge of political theory. The Federalist Papers, for example, cite numer-
ous references to Western political thought. Madison's discussion of Montesquieu's
ideas in The Federalist No. 47 is just one example.
31. See THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 110-37, 160-88, 214-35, 255-78 (E. Barker ed. &
trans. 1946).
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (J. Madison) U. Cooke ed. 1961).
33. See B. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAws (T. Nugent trans. 1959).
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tional differences divided them. Nor were all fifty-five delegates
convinced of the necessity for major revisions to the Articles of Con-
federation. Indeed, only thirty-eight signed the final product.
As history guided the founders away from yielding too little
power to the government, so too would they check the increased
authority by incorporating much of Montesquieu's plan. An exami-
nation of the constitutional debates and The Federalist Papers reveals
part of their reasoning.
The drafters of the Constitution understood that republics had
a propensity to develop divisive groups that would press their
claims, and if allowed, exceed the legitimate bounds of their author-
ity. But the framers were wise enough to recognize that factions
were a product as well as the price of liberty. Indeed, the very free-
dom promised by the new system encouraged division and faction.
As Madison wrote, "Liberty is to faction what air is to fire ... [but
liberty is also] essential to political life." 34
The best way to provide internal safeguards against the abuse
of power was to incorporate Montesquieu's separation of powers.
Madison expressed this well in The Federalist No. 47: "The accumula-
tion of all powers[,] legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same
hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny." 3
5
Yet more than a simple separation of powers was necessary to
check abusive actions that could flow from the self-interested inter-
pretation of the law. Once again, Madison thoughtfully observed:
"No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his in-
terest would certainly bias his judgment .... With equal, nay with
greater reason, a body of men, are unfit to be both judges and par-
ties . ... 36
Particularly destructive in this regard was the legislative branch,
which, because of its popular support, could draw all power into
what The Federalist Papers described as its "impetuous vortex." 37 As
Madison noted, "parchment barriers" alone would be insufficient to
protect against encroachments of power. 38 To augment the separa-
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Extending the
analogy, Madison further wrote that "it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which
is essential to political life; because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the
annihilation of air, which is essential to human life, because it imparts to fire its destruc-
tive agency." Id.
35. Id., No. 47, at 324.
36. Id., No. 10, at 59.




tion of powers, the authors of the Constitution put in place a system
of checks and balances. The system of separated yet shared power
allows each branch both to act and to defend itself against encroach-
ment by the other branches.
The powers of the Presidency are illustrative. The main roles
are executive: to enforce the laws and command the armed forces,
for example. But Presidential veto power is distinctly legislative,
while the power to pardon is judicial. Similarly, the power of ap-
pointment to high office is shared between the President, who nomi-
nates, and the Senate, which must confirm.
Nothing in the text of the Constitution tells us which of its pro-
visions will function smoothly through the centuries, and which will
erupt into controversy. The founders were farseeing, but no more
clairvoyant than we are today. In the field of foreign policy, they
were careful to specify Congress' power, now an antiquarian oddity,
to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal." 39 But the founders
could not have anticipated the recurring conflicts between the
branches over the power to make war. Under the Constitution the
Congress has the power "[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal, and make rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water."' 40 Yet the Constitution also makes the President Com-
mander-in-Chief of the armed forces and delegates to the President
the power to receive envoys. 4' Treaty powers and the appointment
of ambassadors are shared between the Executive and the Senate.4 2
One of the early disputes is surprisingly topical today. It arose
in 1854 during the administration of Franklin Pierce, a President
most of us would consider conspicuously absent from the parade of
history. In response to a minor dispute and in the name of protect-
ing American commercial interests, Pierce sent the U.S.S. Cyane to
Greytown, Nicaragua, to obtain an apology and reparations. Re-
ceiving neither, the ship opened fire on the unarmed town, com-
pletely destroying it. 43
When news of the incident reached the United States, a furious
39. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
40. Id.
41. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 1.
42. Id. at cl. 2.
43. Accounts of the Greytown incident can be found in most American history
books. For a sharper focus on the President's constitutional power to activate the armed
forces, see F. FRIENDLY & M. ELLIOTT, THE CONSTITUTION-THAT DELICATE BALANCE
275-81 (1984); J. JAVITZ & D. KELLERMAN, WHO MAKES WAR: THE PRESIDENT VERSUS
CONGRESS 104-15 (1973); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 50-54
(1972).
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Congress demanded to know why it had not been consulted con-
cerning an obvious act of war, contrary to the precedents estab-
lished by other Chief Executives such as Jefferson and Polk.
Congress eventually lost interest in the dispute, but this contro-
versy, like so many others, ended up in the courts." An American
property owner in Greytown sued the captain of the Cyane. The
court found in favor of the captain on the theory that he was acting
for President Pierce who, as Commander-in-Chief, had the authority
to protect American citizens.4 5
It is odd how history repeats itself. Other Presidents have taken
similar actions, claiming foreign policy as a special prerogative of
the Executive. 46 In fact, it was not until 1973 that Congress began
to reassert itself with the passage, over President Nixon's veto, of
the War Powers Act.4 7 As Senator Javits stated, "The doctrine of
Executive war powers has been erected for nearly two hundred
years. [With the War Powers Act] we are breaking that thread of
history." 48
Another area of conflict is found in the seemingly straightfor-
ward provision of article II, section 2, describing the mechanisms
which may be used to appoint various federal officials. 49 But this
provision says nothing about the circumstances under which these
officials may be removed from office and who is empowered to fire
them. The courts have wrestled with these questions in a variety of
factual settings since the seminal case of Myers v. United States.50 But
recently they have cropped up again, with dramatic results. While
the "power of the purse" has been no stranger to disputes between
the executive and legislative branches, the deficit reduction method,
known by the shorthand of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 5' provided
44. Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4,186).
45. Id. at 112.
46. These actions have occasionally been contested in the courts. See, e.g., Chicago
& So. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (President's power over
foreign air transportation); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936) (President's power to prohibit the sale of arms to foreign nations).
47. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982 & Supp. I 1985).
48. See F. FRIENDLY & M. ELLIOTr, supra note 42, at 279.
49. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2.
50. 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (removal of the Postmaster General). See also Shurtleff v.
United States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903) (Presidential power to remove Customs Department
official). But see Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935) (Presi-
dential power not extended to those who do not occupy a "place in the executive de-
partment and who [exercise] no part of the executive power vested by the Constitution
in the President.").
51. 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (Supp. 1II 1985) (formally entitled the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act).
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the unlikely setting for a challenge concerning appointment and re-
moval power.
I opposed Gramm-Rudman-Hollings from the outset, and I
have few misgivings about its partial demise at the hands of the
Supreme Court in the case of Bowsher v. Synar.5 2 There are two rea-
sons why I believe the legislation was the wrong path to the essential
goal of deficit reduction. The first has less to do with the Constitu-
tion than with the fiscal facts of life. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, like
too many of Congress' deficit-cutting nostrums, took too narrow a
view of our deficit problem. Its automatic deficit reduction mecha-
nism looked to only one side of the ledger: cutting spending. It
ignored the fact that we will never be able to reduce the deficit and
still maintain essential programs that are in the vital national inter-
est if we keep the other side of the ledger, increasing revenues, out
of bounds.
But the more fundamental problem with Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings is constitutional. Legislative decisions about where to spend,
where to cut, and where to tax are for the Congress to make-and
Congress alone-subject, of course, to Presidential veto. If spend-
ing cuts are needed, Congress must decide where the ax should fall
and which programs should be spared the blow. Then members of
Congress must answer to the people for the choices that they make.
The delegation of these decisions to a number-crunching function-
ary of any branch of government violates the spirit of our constitu-
tional system. In my view, the fatal flaw of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings was its attempt to replace the constitutional system of ac-
countability with a mechanical scheme of budget-balancing by
"anonymous consent."15 3
I wish I could say that the courts agreed with me that deficit
reduction is a legislative responsibility that Congress has no power
to delegate to anyone else. In the Supreme Court, Justices Stevens
and Marshall voted to strike down the statute on grounds similar to
those I have outlined here.54 But the majority found a different flaw
in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. This bold initiative to tackle the defi-
cit problem foundered on a rock barely visible in the shoals of the
Constitution: the removal power.
The majority reasoned that the job of administering the across-
52. 106 S. Ct. 3171 (1986).
53. Floor Speech of Senator Charles McC. Mathias,Jr. on the Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings Deficit Reduction Amendment, Chamber of the United States Senate (Nov. 6,
1985).
54. See Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3205 (Stevens, J., and Marshall, J., concurring).
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the-board spending cuts was an executive function." It observed
that Congress had entrusted the ultimate responsibility for impos-
ing those cuts to the Comptroller General, an official removable by
Congress.56 This fact led to the conclusion that the Comptroller
General was an officer of the legislative branch whose exercise of
executive functions violated the separation of powers principle.57
This seems a curious route for the Court to take in striking
down legislation as important as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. But
there is a deeper significance to the Synar decision. The lower court
summarized it aptly when it suggested that Congress' decision to let
automatic cuts substitute for making the hard choices itself exempli-
fied "[t]he human propensity to leave difficult questions to some-
body else."' 58 But the court continued, "The instances are probably
innumerable in which Congress has chosen to decide a difficult issue
itself because of its reluctance to leave the decision ... to an officer
under the control of the executive branch." 59
Consider how the founders would have viewed this dilemma.
They anticipated that the branches of government would occasion-
ally attempt to encroach on each other's power. But the founders
may not have contemplated the abdication of responsibility by both
the legislative and executive branches that has contributed to our
budget deficit crisis. In spite of this, the Constitution has measured
up to the challenge, even though our government has not.
A fuller understanding of the principles embedded in the text
of the Constitution-principles such as the separation of powers-
underscores the shortcomings of the obsessive focus on the narrow
concept of "original intent." A contract, the common law tells us,
must be interpreted with the goal of carrying out the intent of the
contracting parties. The Constitution is, in a sense, a contract. But
unlike the Articles of Confederation, which created a contract
among the sovereign states, the Constitution is the means by which
"We the People" establish a new order-a system of ordered lib-
erty. The establishment of this system was the original intent of the
people who wrote, ratified, and implemented the Constitution. We
are faithful to that intent to the extent that we measure governmen-
tal acts and omissions against the principles underlying that system.
Today that system continues to perform the tasks for which it
55. Id. at 3191.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1404 (D.D.C. 1986).
59. Id. at 1404.
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was designed. It was designed to prevent tyranny, rather than pro-
mote efficiency; so it does not concentrate power, but rather dis-
perses it among the branches and levels of government. It was
designed to focus governmental power on its legitimate objectives;
so government remains fenced out of our houses of worship, our
newsrooms, and the private precincts of our families. It was
designed to enfranchise the people; so the electoral process opens
to an ever-expanding circle of Americans entitled to exercise their
sovereignty.
The Constitution succeeded in solving the pressing problems
the young Nation faced in 1787. With necessary amendments and
the application of its underlying principles to changing conditions,
it has continued to provide a means for a nation grown ever more
powerful, prosperous, and complex to grapple with the problems
presented to it by a dangerous and interdependent world.
The Constitution's bicentennial invites us to celebrate our char-
ter's past and reflect on its vital present. But it also provides an
occasion to dream about its future. The continued success of the
American experiment in ordered liberty will not depend on some
newly discovered shred of historical evidence that sheds a flickering
light on the elusive touchstone of "original intent." As in the past,
the Constitution's future will depend on the ability of a self-gov-
erning nation of free men and women to find within this rich and
living charter the means to confront the challenges of the centuries
ahead.
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